Abstract
Introduction
The origin of today's "Taiwan problem" dates back to the days of the Chinese Civil War when the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) fought with the Chinese Communist Party for control of China. Despite U.S. financial and material assistance and logistic support, the Nationalists were defeated and forced to retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Since then, China has remained divided in two separate political entities, the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan.
The two rival governments, each claiming to be the sole legal government of the whole of China, have shared a common stance that there is only "one China" and that Taiwan was a part of that China. What they have not agreed upon was the claim which government was the rightful ruler of the whole country. Since Beijing has never dropped its claim that the island was a part of its territory to be brought into the fold by persuasion if possible, by force if necessary, cross-strait relations remained strained and characterized by animosities, tensions, threats, and military crises.
As the Cold War divided the world into two spheres of influence, Taiwan became an important link in the U.S. anti-communist alliance system in East Asia. U.S. President Harry Truman considered Taiwan, along with the Philippines and Indo China, important for U.S. security and general stability in the Far East. Under this paradigm, Taiwan became a deflector shield against "red China" and communism in general. Although the SinoSoviet split spurred the United States to switch recognition from the ROC to the PRC and establish diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979, Taiwan remained deeply integrated in the U.S. sphere of influence. Moreover, a few months later the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act that would demonstrate U.S. determination to continue military support to its informal ally. Under U.S. protection, Taiwan began a process of economic, social, and political transformation and rose to the position of a respectable member of the international community.
In the international system, realists argue, states answer to no higher authority and are in constant conflict with other states. Hans Morgenthau writes that anybody who operates in international relations enters a conflict with others who also strive to achieve their interests by force (Morgenthau 1985) . In their view, a gain to one party means a loss to the other. Regardless of variations, all realists tend to view power politics as a zero-sum game and anticipate conflicts of interests between the established major power and rising challengers. Thucydides and Machiavelli demonstrated that the quest for dominance in any competitive political environment is, by necessity, continuous and relentless, with all political entities, whether they be individuals or states, seeking to expand their power whenever they can do so without undue penalty because their circumstances simply permit it (Tellis in Shambaugh 2013: 82) .
Some realists believe that a conflict can be postponed, and a rising peer competitor deterred in the short to medium term, but in the longer term the intrinsic imperative of survival drives states into prolongedand dangerous -competition (Shambaugh 2013: 82) . Since the world is composed of opposing interests, conflict among competing states is inevitable. Realists only disagree over the degree of its intensity.
Realists identify major powers that constitute the system's poles in the international system, as well as middle powers and smaller states that seek to define their relations with the major powers. The classic power transition pathway pits a rising great power against the status quo leading state and it expects that conflict -and perhaps war -will be generated as the rising state reaches parity with the declining lead state (Ikenberry 2008: 111) .
When a major power is gradually displaced by a new rising power, whose ascent to primacy would challenge the existing international order, the international system becomes highly unstable. This is known in neorealist thinking as power-transition theory. The term "power transition"
comes from Kenneth Organski's classical work, World Politics. It refers to several important aspects of international relations. First, it is about a significant increase of national power in a big nation (in terms of its territorial and demographic size) as a result of its genuine and rapid economic development. Second, it is the impact of this growing power on the international system, especially on the hegemonic position of the dominant nation in this international system (Lai 2011: 5) . Power transition theory holds that the period when a rising power approaches parity with the established power is the most unstable and prone to conflict -what Organski and Kugler described as the "crossover" point (see Shambaugh 2013: 10-11) . Historically, such great power transitions have been fertile ground for confrontation, since the established power typically resists the rising country's efforts to strengthen its military, seize territory and colonies, and otherwise remake its region into a sphere of influence in which the other countries must constrain their foreign and sometimes domestic politics in ways acceptable to the new hegemon (Weiz 2013: 9) .
As a new rising entity challenges the existing balance of security in the system, the established power has to deal with the issue whether and to what extent this is a peaceful shift or a conflictual transition. The sense of strength and weakness upsets the balance of security in the international system and results in a security dilemma. According to classical realists, "structural anarchy," or the absence of a central authority to settle disputes, is the essential feature of the contemporary system, and gives rise to the "security dilemma": in a self-help system one nation's search for security often leaves its current and potential adversaries insecure, any nation that strives for absolute security leaves all others in the system absolutely insecure, and it can provide a powerful incentive for arms races and other types of hostile reactions (Holsti 2004: 54) . As a result, a vicious circle of spiraling (in)security arises in the international system.
To confront a rising power, the dominant state can sustain its primacy through "balancing" and "strategic hedging" tactics. Realists differentiate internal balancing, which reallocates resources from other purposes to national security, from external balancing, carried out through alliances and other (formal and informal) agreements (Donnelly in Burchill and Linklatter 2013: 38) . Morgenthau observed that alliances constitute "the most important manifestation of the balance of power" in international systems (See Tow in Robinson and Shambaugh 1994: 119) . Already Thucydides wrote that a state must care of its security by making alliances with other states. It is possible for a dominant state to engage with a rising power. This engagement can be based on either balancing or containment strategy to serve as insurance against uncertain current and future intentions of a rising power. Henry Kissinger emphasizes that the balance of power is the only way to ensure international peace. In other words, no single entity within the international system should be allowed to gain predominance over others. Thus, security is enhanced when power is distributed to limit or curb the quest for hegemony.
With respect to middle powers and smaller states, they seek either to align (bandwagon) with or against (balancing) a superior power.
Bandwagoning means that a state aligns itself with a threatening power to either neutralize the threat or benefit from the spoils of victory (Kang 2007: 51) . Conversely, a weaker state can balance a major power by aligning itself to another great power to avoid submission or destruction.
A state's inability to provide for its own security forces it to rely on external assistance. Maintaining close relations with a powerful ally, a small state can increase its stake in the balance of power game and preserve its freedom and independence from absorption by a preponderant power.
Realists argue that stability and order in the international system are the result of skillful manipulations of flexible alliance systems (Evans and Newnham 1998: 466) .
Realists use a concept of power shift to explain the rise of China and the challenge this rise poses to the global domination of the United States. As rapid economic growth and technological modernization enabled China to expand its political and military power, some observers argue that this trend, if it continues, could undermine the U.S.-dominated unipolar international system and even dethrone the United States from a position of a sole global superpower. According to the realist paradigm, a gain for China would result in a loss for the United States.
That China might already be on the way to overtake the US raises a prospect of a power transition within the international system. Thus, whether China is a status quo power or one that seeks to revise the international system has become a critical issue in Sino-American relations.
As China's rise includes not only economic and political power, but also the policy that enhances its military capabilities, the United States feels less secure and consequently threatened. Whether China's rise will be peaceful or violent is a question that preoccupies scholars and statesmen alike … Scholars who examine the consequences of China's rise through the lenses of either power transition theory or offensive realism predict a future of conflict (Fravel 2010: 505) . Under these assumptions, the push to change the existing distribution of power in China's favor will raise the stakes between the two powers so high that this could send China and the United States on a collision course.
Many realists treat China as an assertive destabilizing power. From a regional perspective, many argue that Beijing is challenging Washington's interests in East Asia. They see China as a country that could become a global superpower accompanied by an aggressive foreign policy contradicting U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Some U.S. observers suspect that China's strategic ambition is to push the United States out of East Asia and become the dominant regional hegemon, akin to the Sino-centric order of China's imperial period (Bergsten at al 2006: 125) . Henry Kissinger highlights that some American strategic thinkers argue that Chinese policy pursues two long-term objectives: first, to displace the United States as the preeminent power in the Western Pacific; and second, to consolidate Asia into an exclusionary bloc deferring to Chinese economic and foreign policy interests (Kissinger 2012: 499) . In his writings, John Mearsheimer expounds his "iron law": that all powers seek hegemony, are discontent with balance of power, and therefore the United States and China are no exceptions. This presents, in his view, a grave and future danger to the United States and its own hegemonic position in Asia and the world.
Aaron Friedberg essentially shares Mearsheimer's view that the United
States and China are locked in a "contest for supremacy" (Shambaugh 2013: 11) . Robert Kagan emphasizes that China aims "in the near term, to replace the United States as the dominant power in East Asia and in the long term to challenge America's position as the dominant power in the world (See Dou in Peng Er and Wei 2009: 12) . Zbigniew Brzezinski anticipated that a strong China could seriously challenge U.S. interests in the region and might be much more tempted to resolve the issue of Taiwan by force, irrespective of America's attitude (Brzezinski 1997) .
Whether China is a status quo power or one that seeks to revise the international system has become a critical issue in the United States. In recent years, a number of analysts argued that the rise of modern China resembles the rise of Wilhelmine Germany a century ago. Fareed Zakaria has written that "like Germany in the late 19 th century, China is also growing rapidly but uncertainly into a global system in which it feels it deserves more attention and honor. China's military is a powerful political player, as was the Prussian officer corps" (Zakaria 1996) . Charles Krauthammer has written that "modern China is the Germany of a century ago -a rising, expanding, have-not power seeking its place in the sun" (Krauthammer 2010). As Wilhelmine Germany seized the opportunity to confront Britain as the ruling hegemon, some scholars and policy advisers argue that the perceived decline of U.S. power could encourage China to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Why Taiwan maters to China
For China, Taiwan is an island that has a deep symbolic meaning. It is a vestige of the "century of humiliation" characterized by foreign intervention and Western imperialism. The widespread discontent experienced by modern China is largely attributable to the continuing memory of the humiliation it suffered at the hands of foreign powers throughout the nineteenth century and a good part of the twentieth century (Camilleri 1985: 3) .
As a tangible reminder of China's division and its national humiliation, China's memory of this period as a time when it was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists serves as the foundation for its modern identity and purpose (Wang 2013) .
For more than six decades, Taiwan has remained an issue of nation building and competing conceptions of identity between Beijing and Taipei. Both
Chinese sides agreed that Taiwan and the mainland were part of the same political entity. The disagreement was about which Chinese government was the rightful ruler (Kissinger 2012: 140 (Kang 2007: 80) .
Since the first emperor Qin Shi Huang formed the nucleus of united China more than two thousand years ago, China experienced invasions, dynastic change, national division, and violations of its sovereignty, but it always reverted to a unified state. Chinese "unity" as a result is equated in China's national consciousness with the height of the country's power and prestige, while division and disunity are associated with its lowest points of weakness and humiliation (Bergsten et al. 2006: 118-119) . Thus, the recovery of Taiwan to the mainland has been a matter of cohesiveness of the Chinese nation.
This fixation on the cycle of Chinese history has made the recovery of Taiwan seem like a sacred mission (Klintworth 2001) . In Beijing's view, so long as Taiwan remained under a separate administrative authority receiving foreign and military assistance, the project of founding a "New China"
would remain incomplete (Kissinger 2012:140) .
Acting as a de facto independent state, Beijing also fears, Taiwan indirectly encourages separatist tendencies in regions on the mainland. If it declares independence, Taiwan could set a dangerous precedent. Under these circumstances, China's existing minority problems are likely to intensify because secessionist movements, for example in Tibet and Xinjiang, would be further encouraged (Ross 2002: 55 The Taiwan issue is also a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. The downfall of Communism held major implications for China. The regime in Beijing has lost its ideological foundations and tied its legitimacy to keeping China "whole". If it turned out that the CCP is not capable to keep all of its territory under its control, confidence in the Party would be undermined. As Communism declined as a credible and unifying ideology, boosting China's prosperity, restoring its prestige and stature as a great power, and unifying the nation -that is returning Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan to the "motherland" -became critical issues to the CCP's accountability to lead and, arguably, essential elements of regime survival itself (Bergsten et al 2006: 119) . Derek Mitchell, Asia specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explains that for the Chinese psyche, the unity of the nation is equated to national greatness (Mitchell according to Marquand 2004) . In this context, a loss of Taiwan would threaten its nationalist credentials to govern and would deal a severe blow to China's prestige and self-confidence, especially with its implications for the separatist movements in Tibet and the Muslim northwest (Tian 2006: 2) .
Since few believe in Marxism-Leninism, the CCP also seeks legitimacy by invoking nationalist sentiments. Realizing that communist ideology was not popular enough to support their continued monopoly of power, leaders in Beijing played up themes of Chinese nationalism to support their rule (Sutter 2010: 18) . The return of Hong Kong and Macao to the motherland was a major event that greatly enhanced national self-confidence of the Chinese people on the mainland. It has also boosted the power and prestige of the CCP. On the other hand, a de facto independent Taiwan enhances the sense of weakness, humiliation, and disgrace. It is also a living reproach to the PRC leadership. Thus, the regime in Beijing draws on the emotion of resentment in order to strengthen the Party and the state.
National stability, a strong voice in world affairs, and improved domestic economic conditions also serve as a source of legitimacy for the PRC.
However, lack of political liberalization, strict party control, corruption, lack of social care, rural-urban imbalance, and growing wealth disparities amplify the sense of disaffection among the Chinese people. Despite being acknowledged for China's overall economic growth, there is little http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/wjzc/t24881.htm indication that the CCP as a party is capable of dealing with some of the social tensions that this growth is creating (Westad 2012: 448) . Thus, partysponsored nationalism, which plays an important role in China's domestic stability, serves as a catalyst for discontent of the Chinese people.
Greater economic interaction between the mainland and the island also plays an important role in Beijing's Taiwan policy. China is Taiwan's largest trading partner and also the island's number one destination for foreign direct investment. Beijing hopes that the benefits of economic cooperation will lead to negotiation with Taipei advantage over any country that could strive for power projection in the region. As a rising power, China believes that it must be able to maintain strategic advantage over anyone seeking to operate close to its shores.
Thus, Taiwan will provide the People's Liberation Army with naval and air bases and give it a strategic depth that it currently lacks. The island is also important for the PLA's control of Japan's southern flank and the Luzon Strait, the waterway connecting the South China Sea to the Philippine Sea. Controlling the northern and southern waterways, China will have the advantage to settle on its own terms longstanding territorial and sovereignty disputes with Japan, the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries. All parties involved consider the disputed territories important due to rich fishing areas and possible natural resources like oil, gas and mineral deposits. Finally, this could enable China to project power onto the major trade routes through which half of the world's total trade passes. Advanced strategic positioning in the region would allow
China to expand its sphere of influence and strengthen its position in East and Southeast Asia. According to one senior Chinese military theorist,
Taiwan has "far reaching significance to breaking the international forces'
blockade against China's maritime security. … Only when we break this blockade shall we be able to talk about China's rise. … To rise suddenly, China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future The relevance of Taiwan to the United States lies also in its geostrategic position. Taiwan is an important strategic asset for any power that wants to secure a "higher ground" in the region. The geostrategic value of Taiwan is in the fact that the island is part of the "first island chain", an arc stretching from the Aleutians in the north to Borneo in the south that locks the Yellow Sea, South China Sea and East China Sea. 6 For the United
States, controlling the arc means obstructing China's potential expansion from its shores deeper into the Pacific.
Many strategists emphasize that for now China is "contained" by a proximate chain of islands extending southward from Japan, through the Ryukyu's, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Australia. To get into the Pacific Ocean, China's naval vessels must go through one of the various choke points between these islands. If Taiwan were to become part of China, this would change. China's navy would no longer be hemmed in, and would be able to extend its reach to the "second island chain" -Guam, the Marianas and some other small islands in the central Pacific -not much of a barrier (Cooper 2011 Beijing's recent decision to restrain universal suffrage for the election of the Hong Kong's chief executive, which largely ignored the demands of pro-democracy groups that have staged several large protests calling for free and direct elections, breaks any illusion that Taiwan would one day willingly agree to the "one country, two systems" arrangement. only for qualified final products, which they then export to world markets through networks outside the mainland. This strategy of capitalizing on a combination of the cheap labor of mainland China and Taiwanese production efficiency has proved successful and promises significant returns to both the investing and the invested parties (Tian 2006: 67) . Those who support stronger economic interaction with the mainland see rapid development on the Chinese mainland as an economic opportunity that may enrich individuals as well as Taiwanese society. Thus, they argue that the government should take on measures facilitating the growth of crossStrait economic interactions (Wang et al. 2010: 160-161) . After all, the business community has invested too much to risk everything by actively supporting Taiwan's independence.
Despite an active policy of rapprochement with the mainland, many in Taiwan Many also fear that it would increase the island's political vulnerability.
Some analysts argue that deepening cross-Strait economic ties is a potential threat to Taiwan's national security. 11 Taiwanese security planners are concerned that Taiwan's business -particularly its hightech firms -may be indirectly helping to strengthen the PRC's military capabilities (Carpenter 2005: 80) . Bush summarizes that growing economic interdependence concerns take three forms. First, some worry about the "hostage effect", believing that Taiwanese companies will become so dependent on the mainland that the island will become vulnerable to economic leverage from Beijing. The second concern is about the "fifth column effect". According to this view, Taiwanese businessmen on the mainland will become a lobby for the PRC and a tool that will help China accomplish its political agenda. The third is the "hollowing-out effect", or the concern that the movement of Asia and the West. Beijing recognized that its economic and diplomatic success placed it in a more prominent position to operate more actively within regional and world affairs (Sutter 2010: 103) .
Leaving behind the low profile in the international system, China tries to portray itself as a responsible global player. Its goals, in the official formulations, are a "harmonious society" and a "harmonious world" (Kissinger 2012: 458) . In 1997, China unveiled a "New Security Concept" emphasizing peaceful coexistence, mutually beneficial economic contacts, dialogue among states to increase trust, and the peaceful settlement of disputes as its core interests (Kang 2007: 84 China to amplify its political and military power, Beijing has become increasingly confident that trends in national power are moving in its favor. During the last decade China has been building up comprehensive national power, expanding its role within the international system, advancing its military capabilities, and adopting new strategies in order to restore its prestige and stature as a great power capable of ensuring its interests. China has leveraged the obvious power of an economically vibrant and growing nation of more than a billion people to ensure that its interests are met with due respect by regional states, without accentuating its growing military power (although the region is clearly aware of this development) (Bergsten 2006: 127) . Translating its growing military budget (nearly US$ 132 billion for 2014) and military modernization into hard power, Beijing has been creating conditions that will serve its own interests. Using its growing naval and aerial might to more forcefully assert its vast claims over the oil and gas rich areas, important waterways and Parcel, Spratly and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, including a recent declaration of an Air defense Identification Zone over the East China Sea, China seems to be engaging in a broad-based push to lay claim to the entire region. Given China's recent activities, it is evident that China strives to restore its great power status and in doing so has been, intentionally or not, moving toward regional hegemony.
Thomas J. Christensen summed up China's strategic goals, widely accepted by other specialists and commentators, to include regime security, preserving territorial integrity, and gaining prestige, power, and respect on the international stage (Christensen in Sutter 2010: 7) . However, as a great power, it has to demonstrate it is capable of preserving its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In doing so, it has to wipe out the vestige of its "century of humiliation", namely, to bring back Taiwan to the "motherland". Having recovered Hong Kong and Macao, China's concern over its "territorial integrity" is most associated with the (re) claiming of sovereign control over Taiwan and continued control of the restive western autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet (Bergsten et al. 2006: 119) . As China considers Taiwan's continued separation from the mainland a lingering legacy of its "century of humiliation", return of the island to the "motherland" has become crucial to China's self-identity, honor, power, and prestige.
China's resolute posture toward Taiwan is evident in Beijing's persistent claim it may use force to retain the island as an "integral" part of China. While China has been publicly and formally willing to reject the use of force to settle other regional issues, such as the Spratly islands dispute, it has steadfastly been unwilling to do so in the case of Taiwan and indeed has been doing everything possible to make credible its threat to use force in order to stop Taiwan from declaring independence (Kang 2007: 93) . To show that it is decisive in defending its policy of "one-China", Beijing took a crucial step that would codify its resolution to dissuade Taiwan from any possibility of formal secession. In March 2005, the National People's Congress passed the anti-secession law that gives the PRC the right to "employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity". 14 The escalation of threats to use force was a clear response to President Chen Shui-bian's initiatives, namely, promoting a new constitution, pressing for referendums on issues related to Taiwan's sovereignty, and filling an application for United Nations membership for Taiwan. By legally mandating the use of force to prevent secession, the law is designed to clear up any uncertainty over whether
China is willing to sacrifice peace to preserve territorial integrity (Lieberthal 2005) . In December, the Chinese government sent another warning to the government of Taiwan, issuing a defense white paper that underscored the PRC's growing agitation about Taipei's pro-independence activities and a determination to halt them. The white paper warned explicitly:
"Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of 'Taiwan independence', the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost" (see Carpenter 2005: 111) .
The menacing tone of the legislation and white paper, accompanied by more than 1,200 ballistic and cruise missiles poised just across the Taiwan Strait ready to punish any move toward formal independence has been explicit warning to Taipei that China was ready to take Taiwan back by force should its leaders challenge the status quo in the Strait. In addition to being part of a campaign of psychological warfare against Taiwan, the legislation was designed to eliminate any lingering ambiguity in
Beijing's position. The Taiwanese people would be put on notice that if they continued to resist reunification and persisted in the "fiction" that
14 The full text of the anti-secession law is available at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm the island was a country separate from the PRC, they were now in direct violation of Chinese law (Ibid: 109). Due to prevalent opinion in Beijing that Washington has sought to encourage Taiwanese independence, China's harsh policy toward Taiwan also sent a direct message to the White House to curb Taipei's separatist tendencies.
Realizing that the risks of provoking Beijing were too great, voters and the business community in Taiwan Despite economic interaction, and faced with a much stronger power across the Strait, Taiwan's main concern has become its survival as a de facto independent state. Thus, Taiwan has been careful not to neglect its informal alliance with the United States as a guarantor of its survival.
Considering the huge gap between Taiwan and China in terms of overall national power and military strength, there is not much Taipei can do to protect the island fully. From the rational actor perspective, the asymmetry between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is so preponderant that it is very difficult for the weaker state (i.e., the ROC) to maneuver alone to get the upper hand, even when the stronger side (i.e., the PRC) is weakened by some internal and external disturbances (Wu and Huang 1995: 214-215) . Thus, Taiwan relies almost completely on the United States to balance Chinese power. In doing so, Taiwan has placed its trust in perceived U.S. Taiwan has always hoped that the United States would come to the aid of its ally if China decided to change the status quo in the Strait by force. Although the United States never specified it would come to defend Taiwan, does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country and, according to President Obama, "fully supports a one-China policy", the
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 demonstrated U.S. determination to provide support to the island. The TRA codified U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity", emphasizing that "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means … would be considered as a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States". 15 U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity" kept both China and
Taiwan on a tight leash, deterring both Beijing and Taipei from provocative actions that work against an eventual peaceful resolution of the impasse. Besides arms sales, the United States also continued training and military counsel to Taiwan's armed forces. These moves are a clear reflection of the long defined U.S. policy that holds that strengthening Taiwan's defenses is crucial to the security and stability of the Taiwan Strait.
Although Washington had welcomed the resumption of cross-Strait talks and cooperation, the rapid growth of China's military budget and buildup of its missiles opposite Taiwan resulted with concern among many U.S.
policymakers in China's intentions toward the island.
The rise of China's power has incited Washington to shift its attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific region. Seeing the Chinese initiatives as potentially levering China's economic power to achieve diplomatic and security gains in the region, the United States has decided to rebalance strategic, diplomatic, and economic priorities to preserve its Although the U.S. seeks to integrate China more fully within the current world order, deep distrust in Beijing's foreign policy has prompted
Washington to respond to its muscular and military policy in the region.
Thus, the pivot to Asia is a security switch aimed at discouraging China's efforts to reshape the world order by the use of force or intimidation. As the United States likes to think that everything that happens everywhere is a direct threat to its security, its strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region has become a necessity for Washington. Under the Obama administration, the pivot to Asia represents a swing of the pendulum from "attempting to cooperate with China on global problems to pushing back against China's assertiveness and challenges to international law and rules" (Glaser 2012: 22) .
Taking into consideration that the Asia-Pacific area remains the fastestgrowing region in the world, the pivot has been followed by the push for will of the standing army in order to make necessary adjustments. They advise Taiwan's fighting forces on how to harden the bunkers to be able to survive the very first round of shelling, especially to preserve the aircrafts. In this way, the United States is trying to help Taiwan to absorb the first strike in case of an invasion from the mainland. 19 Thus, the United States most certainly will not abjure Taiwan. It is most likely that Taiwan will become a pawn in a great power game between Beijing and Washington.
As for Taiwan, it seems that increased U.S. engagement in the region has proved useful for the island. Tamkang University professor Edward I-hsin
Chen concluded that as a result of increased U.S. activity in the region, Taiwan has been relieved from China's political pressure, has been affirmed as a partner, is supported as a strategic democracy, has received arms sales from the U.S., has expanded its international space and has improved its chances of joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Chen 2013: 2, 5 depriving China of an adequate supply of energy for its development; or inducing change in China's political system. Indeed, Chinese internal documents commonly refer to suspicions that the United States seeks to "split (fenhua) and Westernize (xihua)" China … Beijing's concern extends to the U.S. influence along China's periphery, in particular the potential for development of anti-China blocs led by United States (or others) that may seek to contain Chinese power or infiltrate and destabilize China's minority regions (Bergsten et al. 2006: 123-124 China's recent behavior fostered a perception that Beijing was shifting to a more assertive regional policy and that it could quickly change its declared policy of "peaceful rise" toward a more confrontational one. Beijing considers Taiwan an integral part of China, its sovereign territory, and thus its "core interest", similar to Tibet or Xinjiang. As the Chinese elite feels that China's status as a great power depends on unity, nation building, integrity, identity, political legitimacy, and national stability, the return of Taiwan to the "motherland" has become a critical measure to restore national greatness.
Moreover, Beijing wants to ensure that the island cannot be used to encircle and threaten China. The fact that Taiwan is a strategic U.S. ally armed with advanced weaponry is in deep contrast to China's interests.
Thus, it is not likely that Beijing will accept the resolution of the Taiwan issue that would permanently separate the island from the mainland any time soon. A Chinese defense white paper, released in April 2013, declared that China will "resolutely take all necessary measures to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity". 23 Therefore, it seems that
China is ready to prevent Taiwan's independence at all costs. Michael D.
Swaine stresses that although China would prefer to avoid conflict over Taiwan, "this does not mean that it would be unprepared to go to war over the island" (Carpenter 2005: 118) .
Finally, given China's increasing self-confidence about its growing economic and political power, and military capabilities, it is questionable for how long Beijing will be willing to tolerate Taiwan's de facto independence. Should it become clear that Taipei has foreclosed the possibility of future unification, there is little doubt Beijing would take military action, regardless of the potential political or economic price (Bergsten et al. 2006: 138) . Given the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, that would be the worst-case scenario.
It is certain that China and the United States do not intend to go to war, side to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Although the policy of "strategic ambiguity" is not an ideal solution and allows miscalculation, a new U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue is not in sight. Thus, the United States will need to continue to exercise a policy of "dual deterrence" across the Taiwan Strait -encouraging decision makers in both Beijing and Taipei to remain patient, flexible, and constructive, and to avoid provocative actions that work against peaceful resolution of the impasse (Bergsten et al. 2006: 138-139) .
As for Taiwan, the normalization of cross-Strait relations will remain the strategic objective. However, a more confident and decisive China calls for caution. Taiwan confronts the most basic threat to its security: a very large, powerful neighbor is determined to deprive it of its sovereignty (Cole 2006: 32) . The informal alliance with the United States is thus a necessity. In order to control its own fate, Taiwan has no alternative but to maintain its military readiness and strengthen its strategic ties with major powers such as the United States (Wu and Huang 1996: 223 
